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Abstract
The Galois/Counter Mode of Operation (GCM), recently standardized by NIST, si-
multaneously authenticates and encrypts data at speeds not previously possible for
both software and hardware implementations. In GCM, data integrity is achieved
by chaining Galois field multiplication operations while a symmetric key block ci-
pher such as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), is used to meet goals of
confidentiality. Area optimization in a number of proposed high throughput GCM
designs have been approached through implementing efficient composite Sboxes for
AES. Not as much work has been done in reducing area requirements of the Galois
multiplication operation in the GCM which consists of up to 30% of the overall
area using a bruteforce approach. Current pipelined implementations of GCM also
have large key change latencies which potentially reduce the average throughput
expected under traditional internet traffic conditions. This thesis aims to address
these issues by presenting area efficient parallel multiplier designs for the GCM
and provide an approach for achieving low latency key changes. The widely known
Karatsuba parallel multiplier (KA) and the recently proposed Fan-Hasan multiplier
(FH) were designed for the GCM and implemented on ASIC and FPGA architec-
tures. This is the first time these multipliers have been compared with a practical
implementation, and the FH multiplier showed note worthy improvements over the
KA multiplier in terms of delay with similar area requirements.
Using the composite Sbox, ASIC designs of GCM implemented with subquadratic
multipliers are shown to have an area savings of up to 18%, without affecting the
throughput, against designs using the brute force Mastrovito multiplier. For low
delay LUT Sbox designs in GCM, although the subquadratic multipliers are a
part of the critical path, implementations with the FH multiplier showed the high-
est efficiency in terms of area resources and throughput over all other designs.
FPGA results similarly showed a significant reduction in the number of slices using
subquadratic multipliers, and the highest throughput to date for FPGA imple-
mentations of GCM was also achieved. The proposed reduced latency key change
design, which supports all key types of AES, showed a 20% improvement in av-
erage throughput over other GCM designs that do not use the same techniques.
The GCM implementations provided in this thesis provide some of the most area
efficient, yet high throughput designs to date.
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Achieving security goals of data integrity and confidentiality for high speed net-
work applications has been a difficult problem to solve. Applying security features
to network traffic generally cannot be performed at link speeds because of high com-
putational costs. A recently standardized authentication and encryption scheme,
the Galois/Counter Mode of Operation (GCM), has been promising in its ability
to deliver high speed software and hardware implementations not previously possi-
ble. GCM has a number of different properties such as the ability to process data
both sequentially and in parallel that distinguishes it from other similar schemes.
The IEEE and the NIST have both applied this mode of operation in a number of
different applications ranging from, network, tape storage and link level security.
In GCM, authenticity of messages is met by universal hashing over Galois fields
while confidentiality is met by a symmetric block cipher such as the Advanced En-
cryption Standard (AES). Efficient Galois field operations such as multiplication
have been researched extensively for their applications in Elliptic Curve Cryptogra-
phy and numerous implementations have been presented for the AES block cipher
since its acceptance as a NIST Standard. GCM integrates this large body of work,
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and several high throughput hardware designs of GCM have been proposed in the
literature [28, 31, 29, 39, 15].
The driving focus for many of these designs has been in modifying the AES block
in order to achieve both area efficient and high speed datapaths. Not much work,
however, has been done in reducing area requirements of the Galois multiplication
operation in the GCM which consists of up to 30% of the overall area using a
bruteforce Mastrovito multiplier. Since this type of multiplier has a low delay, for
GCM designs using the composite Sbox, the multiplier is not a part of the critical
path by a large margin. The larger delay of the composite Sbox means pipelined
stages are unbalanced and result in wasted area resources. Subquadratic parallel
multipliers provide a smaller area footprint in hardware and therefore provide an
alternative to the brute force approach. Although the delay is higher for this class
of multipliers, it is possible to balance the pipelined stages of the GCM in order to
get more area efficient designs that do not effect the throughput significantly.
Besides area efficiency, there are other improvements possible for the hardware
implementations of GCM. Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) uses the GCM in
one of its mode of operations to help authenticate and encrypt packet data at the
network layer (Layer 3 in the OSI network model). Since this protocol enables
security operations at a lower level, hardware performance is an important factor
to consider. In IPSec, a key change usually occurs in a single session based on
timeouts or when a threshold is reached for data processed. Within this set limit,
numerous packets could potentially be authenticated and encrypted without a key
change occurring between a single link of communication, also known as a Security
Association (SA). High speed hardware implementations of GCM would maintain
hundreds to thousands of SA’s at a time for IPSec. A large number of keys are
maintained in memory and accessed when needed for performing security operations
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on different links of communication [35]. Key changes are expected to occur very
frequently for these cases so latency for changing keys, especially for smaller packet
sizes, can affect performance significantly. Current GCM designs in the literature
have large key change latencies equivalent to the latency in the AES pipeline used,
making the average throughput of these designs much lower then expected.
1.1 Contributions
The following list summarizes the work done in this thesis in order to address the
current issues observed in GCM designs presented in the literature.
. • Provide designs of subquadratic parallel multipliers for GCM
. • Propose key schedule designs for GCM with low key change latency
. • Implement the proposed GCM designs on FPGA and ASIC
The use of subquadratic Galois field multipliers in the GCM is the main contribu-
tion of this thesis. This class of multipliers helps realize area efficient GCM designs
for both ASIC and FPGA architectures without compromising throughput rates
significantly. Two subquadratic space complexity multipliers, the Karatsuba mul-
tiplier (KA) [24] and a recently proposed multiplier by Fan and Hasan (FH) [6],
were the multipliers designed for the GCM. Although the multipliers are designed
specifically for the GCM, the techniques used in this thesis may be generalized
for other applications as well. The FH multiplier is theoretically one of the most
area and delay efficient subquadratic multiplier design in the literature for inter-
mediate size operands, but actual implementations of this multiplier have not been
presented. The main Galois multiplier designs are therefore compared individually
before implementing them with full GCM designs.
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1.2 Structure
Chapter 2 will provide some background to finite field arithmetic which is useful
in understanding the multiplication operation in GCM. An introduction to AES,
with a focus on hardware based implementations will also be provided along with
a functional specification of GCM. Parallel Galois field multipliers for the GCM
will be given in Chapter 3 with implementation results. The GCM datapath and
improvement made to reduce key change latencies will be described in Chapter 4.
ASIC and FPGA results of GCM designs with parallel multipliers is also given in
that chapter. Concluding remarks on the contributions made in this thesis and




The Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) of operation is built using two main components,
namely a finite field multiplier and a 128 bit symmetric block cipher. In order to
understand the GCM better, a brief introduction to finite field arithmetic will be
provided in this chapter. Although any block cipher may be used within the GCM,
since the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is the preferred choice, an overview
of that block cipher will be given as well. The general functionality of GCM will
then be provided in Section 2.3 with a literature survey of previous state of the art.
2.1 Finite Fields
Finite fields, also known as Galois Fields (GF), are algebraic structures with a fi-
nite number of elements. Many cryptographic and signal processing applications
use Galois Fields because of their concise representation in hardware and efficient
arithmetic operations. They have both multiplication and addition operations de-
fined over the field and contain a prime, or a power of prime number of elements.
They are denoted by GF(p) where p is a prime number representing the order, or
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in the case of an extension field, GF(pm) where m is an integer [21].
2.1.1 Galois Field Representation
Galois fields are succinctly stored in hardware by mapping their polynomial rep-
resentations into binary. The binary field GF(2m) is particularly suited for this
and is widely used as a result. Depending on the bases used, a polynomial rep-
resentation can be constructed in the following manner. Given GF(2)[x], a set of
all polynomials with coefficients in GF(2) ∈ {0, 1}, and F (x), an irreducible poly-
nomial within that set, then GF(2)[x]/F (x) is a Galois field with 2m polynomial
elements. In other words, this construction is taking all possible polynomials and
creating a set modulo F (x). The number of polynomials in that reduced set is
2m, and it can therefore be isomorphically mapped to the Galois field GF(2m).
F (x) is called the field generating polynomial and can be selected from any irre-
ducible polynomial of degree m. A polynomial that cannot be factored into any
polynomials in GF(2)[x] is said to be irreducible [21]. Any element within GF(2m)
is representable by polynomials modulo F (x) and all addition and multiplication
operations are also performed modulo the irreducible field polynomial. Since the
polynomial coefficients are either {0,1} they can be easily stored as binary strings.
Basis of Representation
There are different bases of representation that are possible for representing GF(2m)
mapped polynomials and their choice impact how Galois arithmetic computations
are performed. Polynomial basis and normal basis representations are most com-
monly used for cryptographic applications [36, 25, 7], but there are other bases such
as the dual, shifted polynomial, and triangular basis that have also been found use-
ful in the literature [3, 5, 9]. For the binary extension field, a polynomial basis (PB)
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is constructed by finding any element x ∈ GF(2m) such that {1, x, x2, · · · , xm−1}
forms a basis, or a linearly independent set, of GF(2m) over GF(2) [20]. All ele-
ments in GF(2m) can be written with respect to the polynomial basis. The following








m−2 + · · ·+ a1x1 + a0 (2.1)
The normal basis for the binary extension field can similarly be created by
finding any element β ∈ GF(2m) such that {x20 , x21 , x22 , · · · , x2m−1} forms a basis
of GF(2m) over GF(2). It is well prooven that a normal and polynomial basis exists
for all fields GF(pn) [20]. A normal basis representation of an element A(x) is given











The normal basis has some interesting properties that allow for an efficient
implementation of the squaring operation which can be computed by a cyclic shift
of bits. As a result, it has been applied to Elliptic Curve crypto systems which
have frequent squaring operations. Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) makes use
of elliptic curves over finite fields to create schemes for public key cryptography.
2.1.2 Polynomial Basis Galois Field Arithmetic
The GCM described in this paper uses a polynomial basis of representation so Galois
arithmetic operations performed over the binary extension fields with respect to the
polynomial basis will be described here.
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Galois Field Addition
The addition of elements in GF(2)m is equivalent to the addition of mapped poly-
nomials. Since the coefficients in binary extension fields are in GF(2) ∈ {0, 1},
the additions are modulo 2 which is equivalent to a exclusive-or (XOR) operation.
Refer to Eq.(2.3) for this construction. Since there is no carry involved in element
by element addition, the overall computation is simply a XOR operation performed
on bit strings. The additive inverse, or subtraction is also defined for the field, and
for the binary extension field is also computed using the XOR operation.
A(x), B(x) ∈ GF(2m)






Galois field multiplication in relation to addition is slightly more involved since
it consists of a polynomial multiplication followed by a modulo reduction using
the field polynomial. Given two elements to be multiplied, A(x), B(x) ∈ GF(2m),
and F (x), the field polynomial, the result can be computed from Eq.(2.4). The
coefficients of the polynomials A(x) and B(x) are denoted by the vectors (a) and
(b) respectively.





i · a mod F (x)
C(x) ≡ (b0 · a+ b1x · a+ b2x2 · a+ · · ·+ bm−1xm−1 · a) mod F (x)
(2.4)
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A simple method of computing this involves the use of a linear feedback shift
register (LFSR). The pseudo code for this multiplier given below simply loops
through the summation in Eq.(2.4) and accumulates a modulo reduced answer.
The LFSR contains one of the operands A, and depending on its most significant
bit, the field polynomial is XORed to the LFSR at each step. The result of the
multiplication is generated in the register C by the end of m iterations. This
register adds the value of A at each step depending on the coefficients of the other
multiplicand H. This design is called a serial multiplier design, and other multiplier
designs exist such as the parallel multiplier that is able to compute C(x) in a single
iteration. More details will be provided in Section 3.1 for converting Eq.(2.4) into
a parallel multiplier structure.
Algorithm 1 GF(2m) multiplier. [3]
Input A,H ∈ GF(2m), F (x) Field Polynomial.
Output C(x)
C = 0
for i = 0 to m do
if Hi = 1 then
C ← C ⊕ A
end if
if A127 = 0 then
A← rightshift(A)
else





2.2 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
The Advanced Encryption standard is a 128 bit block cipher that has been widely
used since its acceptance in 2001 [23]. The design of AES was intended to be
a more secure replacement of DES (Data Encryption Standard). Many efficient
hardware and software designs have been documented, taking into consideration
various tradeoffs of speed and area resources. The following sections will provide
a general functional description of AES with an increased focus on the hardware
design of AES components. High speed hardware datapaths that will be relevant in
understanding the GCM datapath will be presented toward the end of this section.
2.2.1 AES Round Block
Each round of AES is modular and consists of four main computations namely, Byte
Substitution, Mix Columns, Shift Rows, and Round Key addition. All rounds in
AES are identical with the exception of the last round which has no Mix Columns
operation. Byte Substitution consists of 16, 8 bit word substitutions while the
Mix Columns operation is constructed from a matrix multiplication. Both of these
operations are defined by Galois field operations in GF(28), but there are different
means to implement them. The Shift Rows operation is simply a permutation on
the inputs, and the Round Key operation consists of XORing key values generated
from a Key Schedule component. The following diagram illustrates the general
round structure of AES which is repeated based on the key input. For a 128 bit
key, a single round repeats 10 times, while the 192 and 256 bit keys have 12 and
14 rounds of computation respectively for increased security.
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Figure 2.1: AES Round Structure
Different hardware datapaths can be created from this modular round structure.
An iterative design can use the same design given above but simply adds a 128 bit
data register at the end of the round structure. After a maximum of 14 cycles the
AES encryption result can be obtained. This iterative design can be unrolled to
create a pipelined implementation that has registers placed between round blocks.
This is an outer pipelined AES design and a 128 bit output can be generated
at each clock cycle with a full pipeline. There is enough flexibility, however, in
choosing locations of the pipelined registers. Within each of the round components,
additional pipelined stages can be added within the Sub-bytes operation which will
be described in Section 2.2.2. This is labeled as an inner pipelined AES design, and
although a higher latency and area is present, higher throughputs are possible.
The 128 bit plain text input is mapped into a state array which is a 4x4 block of
8 bit words that is manipulated in each round. For the following sections the state
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array block will be used to describe the different round operations so it is important
to understand how the input is transformed into the state array. Figure 2.2 shows
this transformation, by filling bytes of data into the state array by columns. After
the AES encryption round, the last state array outputted is transformed back into
a 128 bit stream.
Figure 2.2: AES Round State Array Transformation
2.2.2 Byte Substitution (Subbytes)
The subbytes operation uses multiple substitution box components (Sbox) each of
which performs an 8 bit substitution. Each 8-bit word of data in the state array,
is substituted using the Sbox. This results in 16 Sbox components used for each
round block, and is the most hardware area consuming part of an AES round. The
Sbox computation is essentially a multiplicative inverse in GF(28) followed by an
affine transformation which is a linear mapping from one vector space to another
[30]. A lookup table of 28 values can be used to implement the Sbox component,
but it can also be mathematically computed using logic gates.
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Sbox Designs
Rijimen, one of the creators of AES showed in [26] a method of computing the Sbox
by breaking operations in GF(28) down to a composite field GF((24)2) resulting
in significant hardware area savings which would otherwise not be possible using
look-up table implementations. The inverse formula for the Sbox is given in its
reduced version, in Eq.(2.5), where λ is (1100)2. The addition, multiplication, and
inverse operations are computed in GF((24)2), and can be further broken down to
the smaller composite fields, GF((22)2) and GF(22), using the divide and conquer
method.
a′x+ b′ = (ax+ b)−1 = a(a2λ+ b(a+ b))−1x+ (b+ a)(a2λ+ b(a+ b))−1 (2.5)
Figure 2.3 shows a visual diagram of the composite Sbox. The isomorphic
mapping to the composite field, (GF(28) → GF((24)2)) can be implemented us-
ing a matrix vector multiplication. The affine transformation consists of a linear
transformation followed by a translation which can be achieved by a matrix vector
multiplication and vector addition respectively. The isomorphic mapping and affine
transformation both use fixed matrices that are sparse so the computation costs of
these operations are minimal [30].
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Figure 2.3: AES Composite Sbox design
The area consumed by the composite Sbox circuit is very low in comparison
with the lookup table approach (LUT). In the above design by Satoh, the Sbox
component consumes 250 gates while a LUT implementation is more than 4 times
larger in area [30]. The computational cost does increase the circuit delay, so for
high speed designs, LUT, and Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) Sbox implementa-
tions are preferred. The BDD implementation provides a slightly faster alternative
to the LUT Sbox consuming less area resources. Each bit of the 8-bit output is
associated with a binary tree and based on the input bits, each tree helps decide
what the output bits should be. The 8 bit input is used as selector values for sev-
eral layers of multiplexers in order to realize the binary trees in hardware. This
type of construction faces large fan out issues for the initial multiplexer layers. An
improved alternative to the BDD that improves these issues is the Twisted-BDD
and is the fastest reported Sbox in the literature. The area requirements of this
design, however, is almost double that of the LUT Sbox design [22].
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2.2.3 Shift Rows
The Shift Rows operations consists of cyclically moving elements around in all but
the first row of the 128 bit input block. The rows are left shifted by 1, 2, and
3 times respectively for rows 2, 3 and 4. The following mapping illustrates this
process. In hardware no logic is required for this step and simple wire connections
are used for this step to route the input to the output.
Figure 2.4: AES Shift Rows
2.2.4 Mix Columns
The mix columns operation consists of a multiplication and reduction operation
over GF(28). Each column of the state array is multiplied by the polynomial 3x3 +
x2+x+2 and reduced modulo the field generating polynomial x4+1. This operation
is generally optimized into a single matrix vector product. The four column blocks
are used as the vectors, while a constant 4x4 matrix is used that combines the
modulo operation. The result vector is stored in the next state array at the same
location as the original column vector. All elements are 8 bits in width and the
multiplication and addition operations are performed over GF(28).

2 3 1 1
1 2 3 1
1 1 2 3











Since the elements of the matrix are of low degree the multiplications are sim-
plified. A multiplication with 2 in GF(28) consists of a shift operation along with
a modulo reduction if an overflow occurs. This operation can be reused with mul-
tiplying by 3, but an extra addition is required since 3·ai = (2·ai)⊕ ai.
2.2.5 Key Schedule
Round keys are XORed at the end of every round and are generated using a Key
Schedule. These keys can be precomputed or generated at each round. The Sbox
components used in the subbytes section are also used here for the round key
generation. For each inputted key length, the method of generating keys is slightly
different, but they contain similar logic components.
The 128 bit key has an Sbox operation done on the last column of the cipher
key state array after the column bytes are rotated. This is followed by a rcon value
XOR addition. The rcon value is generated based on the exponentiation formula
rcon(i) = x254+i mod x8 + x4 + x3 + x + 1 performed over GF(28). These values
are usually precomputed and once the rcon value is added there is an XOR chain
on the columns of the state array that creates the next 128 bit round key. Figure
2.5 shows a single round key computation. This process is repeated by using the
round key as a cipher for generating the next 128 bits of key material. The rcon i
value starts at 1 and increments for each round key.
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Figure 2.5: AES 128 bit Key Schedule Round
The 192 bit key schedule is similarly defined but the XOR chain is extended for
another 2 columns to achieve a full 192 bits of key material. Each round unit of
AES, however, only uses 128 bits of key material at a time, so the remaining bits
are carried over for the next round. Figure 2.6 shows this key generation process.
The six column vectors of the key state array are condensed here and shown as
{A0, A1, · · · , A5}.
Figure 2.6: AES 192 bit Key Schedule Round
The 256 bit key schedule has an additional Sbox computation involved in gen-
erating key material. The first 128 bits of key material is generated as shown in
Figure 2.5. For the next 128 bits of key material, an Sbox computation is performed
on the fourth column and this follows another chain of XOR statements. Note that
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the rcon operation is not performed here with the Sbox.
Figure 2.7: AES 256 bit Key Schedule Round
In order to compute the key schedule operation in hardware most designs gen-
erally precompute roundkeys before starting data encryption or decryption. Com-
puting the key schedule on the fly, while rounds are being computed is possible for
encryption, and has been implemented for iterative AES [16, 1]. There is added
complexity when supporting all keys primarily because of the overlap occurring in
operations. Figure 2.8 shows that although 128 bits of key material are generated
at each round, there is still key material computed from previous round keys for the
192 and 256 bit key schedules. The Srcon represents a Sbox computation with an
rcon computation, while an S represents a simple Sbox computation. The arrows
represent the XOR chaining of column vectors.
Figure 2.8: AES Key Schedule Pattern
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For an Iterative key schedule the Sbox components are needed only once in each
iteration for all round keys as can be seen in Figure 2.8. Although the 192 bit key
has an Sbox in the middle of the round, it can still be used with the other key
types. The delay of the design in this way is also limited to have only Sbox, rcon,
and an XOR chain of computations regardless of the key used, so compared to a
AES round block, it would not be apart of the critical path. The rcon values may
or may not be included depending on if the key is 256 bits. The control unit for this
key schedule drives multiplexers to guide input into the Sboxes, and direct outputs
to the correct round key registers based on the key type.
Iterative key schedules have been used in pipelined designs for pre-computing
keys, but there is a key latency cost associated with such an integration. If key
changes occur more frequently for a flow of data the throughput in pipelined de-
signs would be affected since clock cycles are wasted in updating key material.
Having lower key change latencies therefore is very relevant for increasing the av-
erage throughput for AES.
2.3 GCM Overview
There have been several schemes devised which combine security goals of both au-
thentication and confidentiality. Data authentication provides a means to detect
accidental and unauthorized modifications of data while confidentiality helps en-
sure that data is readable only by the individuals it was intended for. Schemes
such as CCM[34] and EAX[2] meet those goals by using existing authentication
schemes in conjunction with a block cipher encryption in counter mode for achiev-
ing confidentiality. The authentication and encryption steps for these schemes are
computed separately in two passes so pipelining and processing data in parallel is
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not possible. These schemes are therefore unable to achieve the high throughput
rates needed for network applications. The Offset Code Book (OCB) is a scheme
that overcame these deficiencies by providing a single pass computation for both
the authentication and encryption steps, and is one of the fastest schemes in use
today [27]. Despite the advantages of the scheme, since it has been patented, its
use has been limited in standards.
The Galois/Counter mode of operation is a combined authentication and en-
cryption scheme designed by David Mcgrew and John Viega, and is seen in a number
of recent standards by the NIST and the IEEE. The GCM helped fill a need in the
industry since it allows for fast software and hardware implementations that do not
have intellectual property restrictions [18]. The GCM is a fully piplinable and par-
allel scheme, that shows throughput performance that far exceeds 10 Gbps and in
some cases also has performance which rivals the OCB scheme [19]. The GCM uses
a 128 bit symmetric block cipher such as AES in a counter mode to achieve data
confidentiality, while a chained Galois multiplication operation is used for achieving
data authentication. Both of these operations are performed sequentially on data
blocks, so data can be fed in continuously in a pipeline form. A formal definition
of GCM is given here with reference to the NIST SP80038D Standard [4].
2.3.1 GCM specification
The input to GCM includes AAD (Additional Authenticated Data), P (Plaintext),
K (AES encryption key), and IV (Initialization vector). The inputted AAD and P
are streams of bits broken up into 128 bit blocks, given by A0, A1, A2, · · · , As and
P0, P1, P2, · · · , Pt. If the last block is not 128 bits in length then 0’s are padded
to both the AAD and P streams accordingly. The number of of blocks in AAD is
defined by s while the number of blocks in P is t. The IV is also set to 96 bits
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and this is the ideal for hardware designs since additional operations are required
for other IV lengths.
The output of the scheme is C, a stream of 128 bit cipher text blocks, and the
authentication tag T , which is also 128 bits. The entire tag does not need to be sent
and a predefined number of most significant bits may be sent instead. Although
forgery attacks are possible with smaller tags, the choice of smaller tags may be
necessitated for video or voice applications that stream a large amount of smaller
packets. The NIST has recommneded 32 bit and 64 bit tags for these types of
applications with some additional security considerations limiting the amount of
data encrypted per IV [4]. The following equation illustrates the GCM operation.
For a simpler definition, it is assumed that AAD and P variables have already been
padded with zeros and their lengths are divisible by 128. The Yi values given below
represent counter values for AES input.
.
Y0 = IV ‖0311




Ci = Pi ⊕ AESk(Yi+1)
T = GHASH(H,A,C)⊕ EK0
(2.7)
The following is the GHASH function description that has the Galois field
multiplication operation. The field polynomial for the multiplication operation
is x128 + x7 + x2 + x + 1. The key H is one of the operands for the multiplier
and is generated by performing an AES encryption with an all zeros input (0128).
The other multiplicand is chosen from Ai, Ci, or the length data block. The len()
function, used for generating the length block, computes the total number of bits
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in the operand and returns a 64 bit wide value. AAD and the plaintext are fed into
the len function and the result is then concatenated for creating the length block




(Xi−1 ⊕ Ai) ·H for i = 1 to s
(Xi−1 ⊕ Ci−s) ·H for i = s+ 1 to s+ t
(Xi−1 ⊕ (len(A)||len(P ))) ·H for i = s+ t+ 1
(2.8)
A graphical view of the above equation is provided here with more details on the
functionality of GCM. Block ciphers such as AES have different modes of operation,
and the counter mode of operation is used with GCM as shown in Figure 2.9. A
passed initialization vector (IV ) is constantly incremented and fed into a AES block
for the encryption. Plain text blocks are XORed with the encrypted counter values
in order to obtain ciphertext blocks. The first counter value encryption is later used
for generating the authentication tag.
Figure 2.9: Counter mode AES used for GCM
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GCM supports the authentication of both encrypted and unencrypted data.
This is a useful feature that is included in the IPSec standard, where packet IP
information that needs to be in the clear and read by routers, is authenticated
along with the encrypted payload. The unencrypted data blocks are provided first
into a Galois field multiplier chain followed by the ciphertext blocks. Figure 2.10
shows this process. After all the cipher text blocks are exhausted, the length block
that appends the number of bits in unencrypted and encrypted data blocks is fed
into the GF multiplier. The Ek(Y0) value that was the first encrypted counter value,
is XORed at the end to get the final authentication tag.
Figure 2.10: Galois Multiplier Blocks in GCM
The authentication tag is transmitted with the unencrypted and cipher text
blocks to the destination. The decryption operation is similar to encryption, with
the only change being that the cipher text blocks are XORed with the counter
encryptions resulting in plain text blocks as the output. In Figure 2.9 this can be
visualized by swapping the plaintext and ciphertext blocks. The authentication tag
is generated in the same way at the destination by using the transmitted authen-
ticated data and ciphertext blocks. If the generated tag matches the tag that was
transmitted then the data can be excepted as valid, otherwise it is discarded.
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2.3.2 High Speed GCM Implementations
ASIC implementations of GCM reported in the literature have throughputs of up
to 42 Gbps using outer pipelined AES rounds and a parallel Mastrovito multiplier
for the Galois operation [29]. Composite Sbox implementations were used to get
more area efficient designs, and for higher throughput GCM, the BDD Sboxes
were used. The datapath width of the design is 128 bits, so at every clock cycle
a block is outputted. Commercial designs have reported similar throughputs for
standalone GCM implementations [32, 13]. A parallel architecture that computes
four GCM operations simultaneously was proposed by Satoh and is the highest
reported throughput to date capable of up to 160 Gbps [28]. This design, however,
has an increased number of input pads required for each parallel GCM operation.
A pipelined multiplier architecture was proposed in [31] achieving 54.9 Gbps in
a synthesized version of the design. This design made use of an inner and outer
pipelined AES block with a low latency pipelined multiplier which was constructed
from the parallel architecture GCM. By using this type of construction, the feedback
condition for the multiplier was maintained and a high throughput was achieved
due to the increased pipelined stages. The higher key change latency which ranges
from 40 to 56 cycles, reduces the overall efficiency if there are more cold starts that
occur as a result of key updates.
FPGA designs have also been proposed for the GCM in [15] and using a Shifted
Polynomial basis parallel multiplier their designs achieved up to 15.3 Gbps. The
width of the datapath proposed ranged from 8 to 128 bits, and provided designs
with varying latency and area tradeoffs. Three Sbox solutions, the LUT, composite
and a Block Ram implementation were used in the GCM. Another FPGA design
with notable results was presented in [39] which provided a Karatsuba Algorithm
multiplier(KA) implementation. This design made use of the composite Sbox with
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the KA multiplier to achieve a throughput rate of 15.23 Gbps using outer round
pipelining. Using inner round pipelining and a brute force multiplier a 20.61 Gbps
throughput was achieved but had double the latency. This implementation also
only supported 128 bit AES keys unlike the implementation given in [15] which
supports all key types.
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Chapter 3
Parallel Multiplier Designs for
GCM
Due to the feedback chaining present for the Galois multiplication operation in the
GCM, pipelined designs have generally chosen parallel multipliers to complete the
multiplication step in a single clock cycle. The Mastrovito multiplier has been a
prime choice for its low critical path but it unfortunately has a quadratic space
complexity. Parallel multipliers that have subquadratic area are therefore a good
option to replace the Mastrovito design in GCM. A popular subquadratic multiplier
based on the Karatsuba multiplication algorithm (KA) will be introduced in Section
3.3 and a recently proposed subquadratic multiplier design by Fan-Hasan(FH) will
be introduced in Section 3.4. The Mastrovito multiplier is also presented in order
to allow a better comparison between the multiplier designs.
The three multipliers presented are separable into two categories based on the
approach taken to multiply field elements. The Mastrovito and FH multipliers
use a matrix vector product (MVP) which can compute a modulo reduced result
in a single step. The matrix used in the operation is constructed from the field
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defining polynomial, so this method is applicable when a field polynomial or a set
of polynomials is known ahead of time which is the case for GCM. The KA multiplier
on the other hand is not as tightly coupled with the field polynomial, but computes
multiplication and modulo reduction in two separate steps. The MVP approach is
first described before going into specific multiplier designs for GCM. A comparison
of these parallel multipliers, with FPGA and ASIC implementation results will be
provided toward the end of the chapter. The multipliers are designed specifically
for the GCM operation but may be generalized for other applications as well.
3.1 Matrix Vector Product Based Multiplication
The original GF multiplication operation given in Eq.(2.4) can be modified to
formulate the matrix vector product and the rearranged equation is provided below.
The polynomial matrix P is computed using the coefficients of A(x) while the vector
portion is simply the transposed coefficients of B(x). The matrix vector product
shown here computes the multiplication and reduction operations in a single step
and is applicable to both the Mastrovito and FH multipliers presented in this
chapter.




(xi · a mod F (x)) · bi
C = P · bT
P = {a(0), a(1), a(2), ..., a(m−1)}
(3.1)
In Eq.(3.1), C is the column vector corresponding to the polynomial C(x). An
expansion of the polynomial matrix P is given in Eq.(3.2). The a(i) coefficients are
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essentially column vectors that are modulo reduced versions of xia mod F (x).
a ≡ ax0 mod F (x)
a(1) ≡ ax1 mod F (x)
a(2) ≡ ax2 mod F (x) ≡ a(1)x mod F (x)
a(3) ≡ ax3 mod F (x) ≡ a(2)x mod F (x)
...
a(i) ≡ a(i−1)x mod F (x)
(3.2)
The first column of P , a(0) has the coefficients of A(x) while each subsequent
column is the previous column multiplied by x and modulo reduced by F (x). When
this matrix is multiplied by the coefficients of B(x), the result C(x) is achieved.
3.1.1 GCM Polynomial Matrix
A polynomial matrix P was created with the GCM field generating pentanomial,
x128 + x7 + x2 + x + 1, based on the method given in Eq.(3.2). The top left hand
side of the GCM polynomial matrix is shown in Eq.(3.3) to give a better idea of
what this matrix looks like. Coefficient terms listed such as (a0a127a126) denote the
XOR addition operation (a0 ⊕ a127 ⊕ a126). The repeated elements occurring at
the diagonals of the polynomial matrix are useful in optimizing the multiplication
operation and is utilized in both the Mastrovito and FH multipliers. For the GCM




a0 a127 a126 a125 a124 a123 · · ·
a1 a0a127 a127a126 a126a125 a125a124 a124a123 · · ·
a2 a1a127 a0a127a126 a127a126a125 a126a125a124 a125a124a123 · · ·
a3 a2 a1a127 a0a127a126 a127a126a125 a126a125a124 · · ·
a4 a3 a2 a1a127 a0a127a126 a127a126a125 · · ·
a5 a4 a3 a2 a1a127 a0a127a126 · · ·
a6 a5 a4 a3 a2 a1a127 · · ·










3.2 Mastrovito Multiplier Design using MVP
The Mastrovito multiplier is a widely used parallel multiplier with a quadratic
space complexity [17]. The design is essentially a brute force multiplier in the sense
that the MVP is computed like traditional matrix multiplication. It does optimize
the operation since the repeated values that are present in the polynomial matrix
can be computed once and then reused as signals in hardware for the brute force
multiplication portion. Hardware resources are saved to some extent in this way.
Elements in P are in GF(2), so AND and XOR gates are used for element wise
multiplication and addition respectively. Since the Mastrovito multiplier uses the
brute force approach, after computing elements in P , the Mastrovito design has
a single layer of AND gates for element multiplication followed by layers of XOR
gates to compute the final result. The simplicity of the Mastrovito design is evident
in Figure 3.1 which provides an overview of the multiplier. The design is easy to
code into a low level design using any hardware description language such as VHDL.
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Figure 3.1: Mastrovito multiplier for GCM
The area complexity of the Mastrovito multiplier design for the brute force
portion is m2 AND gates while the number of XOR gates is m2 − m. The XOR
gate count for the polynomial matrix computations will vary based on the field
polynomial, and is computed using the Hamming weight of the matrix. For the
GCM this is equal to 784 XOR gates.
The time complexity can be summarized as TA + (dlog2me + dlog2 θ + 1e)TX ,
where TA and TX is the AND gate and XOR gate delays respectively. The θ constant
is the maximum Hamming weight from all the columns of the polynomial matrix.
Figure 3.2 which shows the number of XOR gate computations required for the top
part of the polynomial matrix created from the GCM field pentanomial (20 rows
shown). The bottom portion of the P matrix has elements repeated at the diagonals
and does not show any other interesting areas. The maximum Hamming weight per
column from this can be seen to be θ = 6 so the maximum delay that is observed
for creating the polynomial matrix is equivalent to a dlog2(6 + 1)eTX = 3 · TX gate
delay.
Figure 3.2: GCM Polynomial Matrix XOR gate counts per element
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3.3 Karatsuba Algorithm Subquadratic Multiplier
The Karatsuba Algorithm (KA) was originally used to compute digit multiplication
[14], and was mapped to polynomials by [24]. It has a subquadratic area complexity
but with a larger delay in comparison with the Mastrovito multiplier. Subquadratic
multipliers such as KA generally decrease the number of multiplication operations
while increasing the number of addition computations. Since the cost of adding
GF elements is low and equivalent to XORing bit streams in hardware, the KA is a
suitable approach for GF multiplication. Using divide and conquer techniques the
multiplication operation is divided up into smaller and smaller operations followed
by an expansion to get the final product. This reduction and subsequent expansion
is constructed by levels of XOR operations and as a result causes the delay of the
multiplier to increase.
3.3.1 KA Multiplier Formulation
The elements A(x), B(x) ∈ GF(2m) are first each split into two polynomials of max
degree m
2
− 1. Ah and Bh represents the upper polynomial coefficients while Al and
Bl represents the lower coefficients of the elements. The following equations show
A(x) split into two smaller polynomial elements, Ah and Al
A(x) = x
m
2 Ah + Al
Ah = (am−1, am−2, · · · , am/2+2, am/2+1)
Al = (am
2
, am/2−1, · · · , a1, a0)
(3.4)
The multiplication of the two elements in GF(2m) is first computed to get a
polynomial of max degree 2m− 2 (C ′(x)). The ⊕ operation represents XORing bit
streams in Eq.(3.5) and multiplication operations shown are with sub-polynomials.
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The original multiplication is divided into three lower degree polynomial multipli-
cations and this can be further split recursively. The C ′(x) element is obtained
once the recursion unrolls, and this is then modulo reduced separately to get the
final C(x) element.
D0, D1, D2 have max degree m/2− 1
.
D0 = AlBl
D1 = (Ah ⊕Bl)(Al ⊕Bh)
D2 = AhBh
C ′(x) = xmD2 ⊕ x
m
2 (D1 ⊕D0 ⊕D2)⊕D0
C(x) = C ′(x) mod F (x)
(3.5)
3.3.2 Modulo Reduction
Modulo reduction of C ′(x) using the field polynomial can be performed by a mul-
tiplication with a fixed reduction matrix. Using the GCM field polynomial as an
example, the higher order coefficients of C ′(x) can be modulo reduced based on the
following equations.
0 ≡ x128 + x7 + x2 + x+ 1 mod F (x)
x128 ≡ x7 + x2 + x+ 1 mod F (x)
x129 ≡ x8 + x3 + x2 + x mod F (x)
· · ·
(3.6)
The reduction matrix has 2m− 2 columns and m rows. The matrix essentially
maps C ′(x) to C(x) and is shown in Figure 3.3 for the GCM. The first m columns of
the matrix form an identity matrix since elements of degree 1 to m− 1 do not need
to be reduced. Using Eq.(3.6), all elements of degree m to 2m− 2 can be modulo
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reduced and then used in creating the remaining m − 2 columns of the reduction
matrix. The cost of this operation in relation to the KA multiplication is small
and is dependent on the field polynomial. The Hamming weight of the reduction
matrix for the GCM shows that this operation requires 527 XOR gates. Having
low order terms within the field polynomial helps reduce the cost of the operation
since higher order terms have additional feedback terms which increase the cost
of the operation. For a field polynomial such as x128 + x40 + x2 + x + 1 the cost
of the operation is 623 XOR gates. The delay for the reduction operation can be
computed by (dlog2 θ+1e)TX , where θ is the largest Hamming weight computed by
row of the reduction matrix. For the GCM reduction matrix this delay is computed
to be 3TX .
Figure 3.3: Reduction Matrix for GCM
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3.3.3 KA Multiplier Design for GCM
The Karatsuba algorithm generally works best with elements of even degree since
each step in the recursion splits polynomials equally. The input element size for
the GCM Galois operation is 128 bits, a power of 2, so the KA multiplier can be
easily applied without any changes required. A high level view of the Karatsuba
multiplier is provided here with all the major components required.
Figure 3.4: Abstract view of the Karatsuba Multiplier
The polynomial elements can be conveniently split down to single element mul-
tiplications but this is not always desirable in terms of area efficiency. When the
ending condition of the recursion is changed and brute force multiplication per-
formed instead, this leads to some savings in terms of AND and XOR gates. The
following table shows the number of gates required for halting at different polyno-
mial sizes. The gate counts do not include the reduction operation which has a
fixed number of gates and a fixed delay of 3TX . The ending condition delays are
based on the brute force multiplication delay which is TA + log2(n)TX where n is
the halting value.
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Table 3.1: Area of the KA Multiplier with varied ending conditions
Halt XOR gates AND gates Total Gates NAND Gates Delay
2 9913 2916 12829 45484 TA + 19TX
4 8455 3888 12343 41596 TA + 17TX
8 7969 5184 13153 42244 TA + 15TX
16 8455 6912 15367 47644 TA + 13TX
32 9913 9216 19129 58084 TA + 11TX
64 12415 12288 24703 74236 TA + 9TX
We can see from Table 3.1 that it is worthwhile halting the KA when the
polynomial size is 4 since it provides the lowest area and delay complexity. Since
the cost of XOR gates in hardware is usually larger than that of AND gates, in
order to get more accurate area estimates for ASIC implementations, the NAND
gate count is included. The area cost of 1 XOR gate is bounded by the area of 4
NAND gates while one AND gate is bounded by the area of 2 NAND gates. When
taking the NAND gate count into consideration the results still showed halting at
4 as the optimal choice in terms of area.
3.4 Fan-Hasan Subquadratic Multiplier
The FH multiplier is a subquadratic area, parallel multiplier that was recently
proposed in [6, 8]. Its asymptotic space complexity is quoted to be 8% lower
than that of KA while its time complexity is 33% lower for a trinomial as the
field polynomial. When compared with the Mastrovito multiplier, although it has
a larger delay its area footprint is less than half for m = 128. The FH multiplier
takes advantage of the Toeplitz structure found in the polynomial matrix P in order
to perform more area efficient multiplication. A Toeplitz matrix vector product
(TMVP) is used for this multiplier and will be described first before going into
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implementation details for the GCM.
3.4.1 TMVP Formulation
A Toeplitz matrix is a matrix which has all diagonal elements equal. The m by
m matrix T given in Eq.(3.7) for example, is a Toeplitz matrix and has elements
in (row i, column j) equal to (i + 1, j + 1). A variant of this matrix, the Hankel
matrix, has equal diagonal elements in the opposite direction where elements (i,
j) equals (i− 1, j + 1). In order to uniquely define a Toeplitz matrix only 2n− 1
elements generated from the first row and column are needed.
The regularity present in the Toeplitz matrix can be used to our advantage when
computing addition and multiplication. Addition of two square Toeplitz matrices
for example only requires 2n − 1 element additions, while the remaining elements
can be copied at the diagonals. Although a brute force method of multiplication
on a TMVP does not provide any benefit, by creating a recursive multiplier design
similar to the KA, it is possible to reduce the area complexity. An important quality
of T useful for the recursive formulation is that all sub matrices of T are in Toeplitz
form as well. Matrices T0, T1, and T2 shown here are all Toeplitz matrices within
the matrix T .
T =

a3 a4 a5 a6
a2 a3 a4 a5
a1 a2 a3 a4























Given a Toeplitz matrix T =
T1 T0
T2 T1
 and vector V =
V0
V1
, the product C = T · V can
be recursively constructed as given in Eq.(3.8). A single matrix vector product is
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P0 = (T1 + T0) · V1
P1 = (T2 + T1) · V0
P2 = T1 · (V0 + V1)
(3.8)
The addition of Toeplitz matrices given in the calculation of P0 and P1 can be
optimized based on the repeated signals [6]. Assuming T is a m by m matrix,
adding half matrices T1 and T0 is computed in m− 1 gates, and m/2− 1 of these
addition signals can be reused in computing T2 and T1. This results in having only
3m/2− 1 gates for computing both additions.
The multiplications for P0, P1 and P2 are all TMVP computations that can be
split further and the recursive design stops upon reaching single element multipli-
cations. Like the KA implementation it is possible to get more savings by halting
the recursion earlier and performing brute force matrix multiplication. Table 3.2
summarizes area of designs halting at different input sizes for a 128 bit FH multi-
plier. It is clearly seen that splitting when the matrix size is 4 has an optimal total
gate count. Taking into consideration the cost of AND and XOR gates in an ASIC
implementation with a NAND gate count, we still see halting at 4 is the optimal.
3.4.2 FH Multiplier Designs for GCM
Although the P matrix for GCM is not a complete Toeplitz matrix, it was shown
in Section 3.1.1 that there are two regions in the matrix that have Toeplitz form
(rows 3 to 7 and rows 8 to 128). Since the approach provided in the previous
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Table 3.2: Area of the FH multiplier with varied ending conditions
Halt XOR Gates AND Gates Total Gates NAND Gates Delay
2 9074 2916 11990 42128 TA + 13TX
4 7859 3888 11747 39212 TA + 12TX
8 7616 5184 12800 40832 TA + 11TX
16 8291 6912 15203 46988 TA + 10TX
32 9884 9216 19100 57968 TA + 9TX
64 12479 12288 24767 74492 TA + 8TX
section works only with square Toeplitz matrices there is some adjustment that
needs to take place on the GCM polynomial matrix. Figure 3.5 shows three possible
approaches to deal with this problem and are summarized here before going into
them in detail. The first approach performs the TMVP on the larger Toeplitz
section by extending it into a 128 x 128 Toeplitz matrix and performing brute force
multiplication on the smaller section. The second approach aims to use the TMVP
on a 122 x 122 portion of the larger Toeplitz section and get the final result by
combining brute form multiplication results of the remaining sections. The last
approach adds values to the existing polynomial matrix in order to convert it into a
full 128 x 128 Toeplitz matrix and then compensate the additions in the end result.
From these three methods the first was implemented in this thesis for its low delay.
Approach 1: Based on [8], the first row of the polynomial matrix is movable
to the bottom of the matrix without disrupting the Toeplitz form. The C0 term of
C(x) as a consequence, moves to the bottom of the result vector. When this is done
a large 122 by 128 bit section is formed that has Toeplitz structure. This section of
the polynomial matrix can be extended to create a full 128 by 128 Toeplitz matrix
by padding 6 zeros to the first column and copying elements over. The TMVP can
then be applied to this matrix. The remaining 6 rows at the top of the matrix can
be computed using the Mastrovito multiplier approach. Since 5 rows in that region
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are in Toeplitz form, it may be possible to use the TMVP, but due to the smaller
dimensions, the Mastrovito multiplier provides better results.
Approach 2: Another method would be to make a square portion out of the
large 122 by 128 bit section and compute that using the TMVP. This means a 122
by 122 matrix is formed that has a Toeplitz structure. As this matrix is being
split, there will be cases where the resulting sub matrices have non-even numbered
dimensions. In that case zeros can be padded to a row and column to create an
even matrix dimension. It is possible to remove a row and column as well but
brute force multiplications would be required to compensate the action. The first
6 columns that are unaccounted for in the 122 by 128 bit section can be computed
by brute force multiplication and the result compensated in the final C(x). The
top part of the polynomial matrix can be computed using the Mastrovito design as
done in Approach 1.
Approach 3: Since some rows at the top of the GCM polynomial matrix
prevents a full Toeplitz structure from occuring, another approach would be to
add certain elements to the problematic rows to create a Toeplitz matrix and then
compensate the changes in the end result. To describe this further, suppose we
have the following matrix vector product computation where w, x, y, and z are
polynomial matrix computations that prevent a Toeplitz structure.




a3 a4 a5 a6
a2 a3 ⊕ w a4 ⊕ x a5 ⊕ z
a1 a2 a3 ⊕ w a4 ⊕ x⊕ y










The above computation can be broken up into two MVP where one matrix is in
Toeplitz form and the other compensates the matrix changes made. The subtraction
operation given here is simply a bit wise XOR computation. For the GCM matrix
the compensation would only occur for the first 6 rows of the polynomial matrix
since row 7 onward is in Toeplitz form. This is assuming that the first row is moved
to the bottom of the matrix.
C =

a3 ⊕ w a4 ⊕ x⊕ y a5 ⊕ z a6
a2 a3 ⊕ w a4 ⊕ x⊕ y a5 ⊕ z
a1 a2 a3 ⊕ w a4 ⊕ x⊕ y









w x⊕ y z 0
0 0 y 0
0 0 0 0









3.4.3 FH Multiplier Design Comparisons
In terms of delay, Approach 2 and 3 both add an additional XOR gate delay because
of the compensation operations required on the end result. Approach 3 has the
lowest gate count out of the three, since the matrix compensation step for the first 6
rows is a sparse matrix requiring less brute force multiplications. The first approach
provides the lowest delay and is relatively simpler to implement. By computing the
first few rows using the Mastrovito multiplier has a timing benefit over using only
the compensation step as described in Approach 3. From Figure 3.2 it was seen
that the top 8 rows have the largest delay in computing the polynomial matrix
elements. In Approach 3, the largest polynomial matrix computation (dlog2(6 +
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1)eTX gate delay) in addition to the TMVP computation creates the critical path of
the multiplier. By using the Mastrovito multiplier on the higher delay polynomial
matrix computations found in the first 8 rows, it decreases the critical path of the
multiplier to some degree, since the Mastrovito delay is much smaller than the
TMVP computations. The critical path is limited to the dlog2(4 + 1)eTX delay for
the polynomial matrix computation on row 8 plus the TMVP computation in this
way. An abstract view of this implemented multiplier is provided here.
Figure 3.6: Implemented GCM FH multiplier design
3.5 ASIC and FPGA implementation
The implementation results provided here are full bit parallel multiplier designs for
the GCM and include polynomial/reduction matrix calculations. Java programs
were used in creating low level hardware descriptions of the three multipliers and
generic code for this is provided in Appendix A. The programs essentially output
VHDL assignment commands in conjunction with AND and XOR commands to
achieve optimized bit level operations. The FH multiplier design provided was
modified from the pseudocode given in [6] and the KA multiplier was created using
the same concept as well. Test benches to verify the multipliers were created from
a LFSR multiplier implementation.
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ASIC implementation results were generated using an 130nm Tower Standard
Cell Library. Each multiplier was synthesized using the Cadence RTL compiler
and incrementally optimized several times until no further improvements were
seen. Timing constraints were set according to the type of optimization desired. A
faster clock frequency was set for speed optimization, while area optimizations were
achieved by setting a lower clock frequency. Implementation results are provided
in Table 3.3 for each multiplier, including area and delay results. The expected
area complexities of AND and XOR gates for all the multipliers is also included in
that table. In order to get more focused results, the multipliers implemented here
did not include the feedback condition and register delays of the GCM multiplier
block, but only the logic elements of the multiplier.
The hardware platform used for FPGA implementation was the Xilinx Virtex4-
FX100 which contains 42176 slices. The multipliers were synthesized with a high
effort level using Xilinx ISE and optimized for speed. Each slice on the Virtex4
contains two, four input look up table blocks (4-LUT) and two flip flops. Besides
their use as logic components, slices are also used for routing signals within the
FPGA. Both the slice and 4-LUT counts are provided along with the expected



























































































































































































































































































































































FPGA results showed the Mastrovito multiplier taking up significant area resources
over the FH and the KA multipliers. Almost 20% of the Virtex4’s resources were
taken up with this multiplier, whereas the FH and KA used a maximum of 9%.
The delay for the FH showed a 8% improvement over the KA. The NAND gate
counts for the FH are much higher than the KA becuase of the additional brute
force computations required and this can be seen by the extra slice counts of the
FH.
The ASIC results for the Mastrovito multiplier, as expected, show its advantage
in terms of delay but it has 35% more area than the FH when optimized for speed
and slightly more then double the area requirements over the subquadratic multi-
pliers when optimized for area. Between the subquadratic multipliers, the FH had
a 7% advantage in area and a 5% speed improvement over KA when optimized for
speed. There are some possible reasons why the FH did not perform better in terms
of delay. It should be noted that the original published paper on the TMVP used
the Shifted Polynomial Basis (SPB) with a trinomial as the field polynomial which
is expected to have a lower delay. The GCM pentanomial adds additional delay
which is a possible reason for the descreapency in the results. The standard cell
library used had a wide range of cells so it is possible that lower level optimizations
caused the KA to have performance closer to the FH. For example, the KA mul-
tiplier for its ending steps has overlapping polynomial additions which take place
with a delay of 2TX . Standard cells with more input pads, such as a four input
XOR gate would help reduce this delay in the KA multiplier for some areas. This
type of optimization is not as pronounced for the FH multiplier since each step is
more divided. When using a 180nm library with a basic set of standard cells, the
delay of the FH was up to 14% faster than the KA, a result closer to theoretical
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expectations.
With a FH multiplier design, the maximum possible throughput is 79 Gbps
while for the Mastrovito multiplier we have close to 113 Gbps. In [10, 12], it was
shown that for AES, throughput rates closer to 80 Gbps is achievable only with
inner pipelining which consumes a significant amount of area resources and when
using outer round pipelining, a maximum throughput of 48.2 Gbps was achieved
with a LUT Sbox. Although these results were presented for a 180nm Standard cell
library, we can deduce it is difficult to achieve AES throughput rates which match
the multiplier throughput when a composite Sbox is used. With high speed FPGA
implementations of AES as given in [11], a similar argument can be made.
This means that using the FH or KA over the Mastrovito multiplier would
be the preferred choice for this implementation since it would not be the delay
critical portion of the datapath. With a 130nm ASIC implementation of AES
implemented in [29], the FH multiplier would be part of the critical path because
of the low latency BDD Sbox design was used. By using a LUT Sbox design,
which is 20% slower and less area consuming, more balanced pipelined stages may
be achieved with the FH even though it is apart of the critical path. Based on
this, the subquadratic multipliers were implemented into a pipelined AES-GCM
datapath and the results are detailed in the following chapter.
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Chapter 4
GCM ASIC and FPGA
Implementation
Previously proposed GCM designs have focused primarily on increasing the overall
throughput of pipelined datapaths. Attempts at reducing the hardware area have
been approached by using iterative AES designs or by implementing smaller Sbox
components since they encompass a significant portion of the AES block. From
the multiplier implementations shown in the previous chapter we can see that it
is possible to optimize the Galois field multiplier design of GCM without affecting
the throughput significantly. Modifications of existing AES and GCM designs were
done with the aim of increasing the average throughputs and to balance pipeline
stages so that area resources are used efficiently. The GCM datapath used in this
work is detailed first followed by ASIC and FPGA implementation results of the
GCM using the different multiplier designs.
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4.1 GCM Datapath
The GCM pipelined datapath employed for this work is provided in Figure 4.1.
The datapath used here is similar to the one given in [38] and [15] but differs more
in its lower level components. Block inputs for the GCM are 128 bits in length and
are fed into the pipelined GCM which processes them sequentially. The data path
provided supports both GCM encryption and decryption. An online key schedule
is employed in such a way that a 1 to 4 clock cycle latency is experienced for key
changes. Some of the important design decisions made while developing the GCM
are provided here with reference to previous designs in the literature. Justification
of adjustments made to previous designs is also provided.
4.1.1 Design Considerations
The GCM has an overall latency of 13, 15, or 17 cycles based on the key type
used. After the AES operation, a 2 clock cycle latency is present for the Galois
multiplication operation, and a multiplexer. The timing diagram of the GCM design
is provided in Figure 4.2. The IV vector input was fixed to 96 bits in this design
which has been recommended by NIST for providing higher throughput designs [4].
For variable length IV inputs an additional clock cycle of latency is added to the
design since the IV needs to be fed into the Galois multiplication operation before
it can be used. A simple incremental counter is used upon getting the IV input
and a register holds the current Yi value. Although a register is present, the design

















































The sequential nature of the datapath simplifies the control signals significantly.
The data type signal is pipelined through the entire datapath and all blocks read the
signals at the appropriate stages to direct outputs accordingly. GCM encryption
and decryption operations are easily controllable by a Mode signal. The only change
in functionality is in the multiplexer feeding input into the Galois multiplier. Under
encryption, AAD and AES encrypted ciphertext blocks are fed into the multiplier
sequentially. For decryption, the multiplexer selects the AAD and ciphertext blocks
from the FIFO.
Pipelined registers are included within the major blocks and also in some loca-
tions to help increase throughput. The multiplexer used for feeding in data into
the multiplier, for example, is held in a register for one clock cycle. This was done
to reduce some of the combinatorial delay going into the GF multiplier. The use
of the FIFO for feeding in datablocks is used in previous designs but more recently
proposed designs by [29] omit it.
AAD and ciphertext blocks can be processed simultaneously under some con-
ditions when no FIFO block is present but such a design has a more complicated
control unit. Another possible reason for omitting the FIFO is that while a key
update is taking place, AAD data blocks can be fed directly into the multiplier
without requiring the need for the FIFO. This, however, requires the multiplier key
to be generated using an Iterative AES block which was not used in [29]. By not
including the FIFO block, an external source is forced to drive the chip and provide
input blocks at the correct time to synchronize with the AES output blocks. In-
cluding the FIFO helps provide a better interface for the chip and a simpler control
unit design.
49
4.2 Pipelined AES Design
An outer pipelined AES block was used for the GCM design that has a latency
of 10,12 or 14 clock cycles depending on a 128 bit, 192 bit or 256 bit key chosen
respectively. Inner pipelined rounds were not used since the parallel multipliers have
a larger critical delay which would not be able to keep up with a higher frequency
clock. There were two types of Sbox designs implemented, the composite Sbox
design presented in [30] as well as a lower delay LUT design. The Mix Columns
operation was performed by brute force multiplication to have minimal delay. The
key schedule design is a modified version of [29] to provide lower latency for overall
key updates in both the AES and multiplier blocks.
4.2.1 Key Schedule Considerations
Varying schemes for updating key values in the GCM datapath have been used in
the literature. The design given in [38] uses an iterative AES block for updating the
key for the GF multiplier while an offline key schedule is used for computing 128 bit
AES round keys. Satoh uses an iterative key schedule design supporting all AES
key types, but round keys are pre-calculated for their pipelined architectures and
are not used until the entire key schedule has finished updating them [29]. Satoh
does not specify additional details for key changes in his work but given that keys
are pre-calculated, there is a 10-14 cycle latency in his design. The overall average
throughput would decrease if more frequent key changes occur. Although online
key schedules have been proposed in [33, 16], they have either been limited to 128
bit keys, or for iterative AES designs. To the best of the authors knowledge, a low
latency online key schedule that supports all key types for a pipelined AES–GCM
has not been proposed.
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The key schedule implemented in this thesis is identical to iterative the key
schedule in [29] but is made to be better integrated into the GCM pipeline. The
latency for this proposed design is a maximum of 13 cycles depending on the type
of input blocks and key sizes used. If the number of datablocks processed per key is
larger then 14 blocks, then the maximum latency would be 1 on average. The blocks
of data being processed in the AES pipeline by a previous key are not affected by
the changes and only future input blocks are. Given these operating conditions,
this key schedule integration provides a better average throughput over previous
work which have latencies equivalent to the size of the AES pipeline.
4.2.2 Low Latency Iterative Key Schedule
An initial design attempt was made by unrolling an iterative key schedule and
pipelining it. Although such a design would be ideal and have the potential of
changing AES keys at every cycle of input with no latency cost, it is a very area
intensive design. This unrolled design requires an additional 14 x 4 Sbox compo-
nents which is equivalent to a little less then a third of the total area of the AES
block. An iterative key schedule, on the other hand, is much more area efficient and
consumes only 4 Sbox components along with some smaller logic components. Each
round of the pipelined AES block has its own round key register which is updated
by the key schedule. In Figure 4.3, we can see that as a new key is updated the old
round key register values still remain until the key schedule updates them at the
appropriate iteration. This property can be used in creating a lower latency key
schedule.
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Figure 4.3: Key Schedule round key register updates by iteration
Since old key values are not updated on the key change, they are still usable
for the current datablocks in the AES pipeline. If all the round keys registers are
filled, then the GCM design would incur a one clock cycle latency for doing a key
update. This one cycle latency is due to the multiplier key block which needs to
be computed by encrypting an all zero input in AES. The new AES round keys are
computed on the fly, and are available in time to do the multiplier key computation.
This latency is assuming that the AES pipeline is filled.
There are some issues with this setup that need to be addressed. The first
problem is that if a key change occurs before all the round key registers have been
filled, then either a stall needs to occur, or the input staggered until all round keys
have been updated. When a new key comes in, the iterative key schedule will shift
to updating the first round key and stop its current key computation. The blocks
in the AES pipeline that were dependent on the old AES key will no long have the
correct round keys added since the Key schedule did not finish updating them. The
worst case condition for this is present for a 256 bit key. If a key change occurs
after a single block has entered the pipeline, then a 13 cycle delay latency is present
to fill the remaining round keys and only after that can encryption begin on new
blocks.
There is another problem that can occur even if the round keys have been
updated. In Figure 4.4 we can see AES round blocks with the corresponding output
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based on the key type. When a key change occurs from a larger key size to a
smaller one, such as a 256 bit key to a 128 bit key, there is a conflict that will
occur. Supposing 256 bit datablocks are in rounds 10 - 14 in the AES pipeline, and
128 bit encrypted values fill rounds 1 to 9. In the next clock cycle, both the 128 bit
encrypted values and the 256 bit encrypted values will be ready for output to the
final block. The pipeline needs to stall for 4 clock cycles in this case to allow data
to finish processing from the old key values. Similarly going from a 256 bit key to
a 192 bit key or a 192 bit to a 128 bit key a 2 clock cycle stall needs to occur.
Figure 4.4: Collision on change in input keys
Pipeline stalling can be avoided by staggering inputs and adding a four clock
cycle latency for all key changes. This would allow the current data blocks in the
pipeline to empty so that collisions are avoided. An alternative method to avoid
pipeline stalls would be to buffer the input of 128 bit and 192 bit key encrypted
rounds to avoid conflicts. The latency of the entire AES block would be fixed to 14
clock cycles but key changes would occur in a single clock cycle for full pipelines.
Figure 4.5 shows the additional registers required for achieving this. Note that in
this case, key type signals need to be pipelined as well which is a minimal cost. A
total of 6 additional 128 bit registers are added to the design with this setup but
the benefit of having a single clock cycle key change latency is gained.
53
Figure 4.5: AES datapath for single cycle key change latency
Given the increased area requirements of the last scheme proposed, the key
schedule with a fixed four cycle latency was employed with the iterative key schedule
in the GCM datapath. Despite the added latency, the average throughput expected
would still be higher than designs which have a fixed 14 cycle latency for all key
changes.
4.3 GCM Implementation Results
4.3.1 ASIC Results
All combinations of the three parallel multipliers presented in Chapter 3 along with
two Sbox designs, the composite and LUT Sbox, were implemented on an ASIC
with a 130 nm Standard Cell Library under average case operating conditions.
Incremental optimizations were used with a high effort level and a sample synthesis
script is provided in Appendix A.3. The synthesis results are summarized on Table
4.1 and gate counts have been approximated using a two way NAND gate as the unit
size which is a standard method of comparison. Design # 1 was the GCM design
with the LUT Sbox while Design # 2 was implemented with the composite Sbox.
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The timing constraints were chosen to allow either area or speed optimizations to
take place. The performance measurement of Kbps/gate allows a better comparison
of speed and area tradeoffs, and these results can be seen in graphical form in Figure
4.7.
The Mastrovito multiplier has 12% more area requirements than the other mul-
tipliers with Design # 1 and a 18% increase in area resources when implemented
with the composite Sbox (Design #2). The critical path for the GCM design was
the GF multiplier in Design #1 since the LUT Sbox has a low delay. When syn-
thesizing this design, the area of the subquadratic multipliers increase in order to
achieve a smaller delay. This area increase is still lower then the Mastrovito mul-
tiplier design so a 12% benefit is seen in overall area requirements. Design #2,
however, had the composite Sbox as part of the critical path. The GF multipliers
as a result are synthesized with a lower area since there is more freedom in terms
of delay. The area benefit for the subquadratic multipliers is much more as a result
over the Mastrovito multiplier design. Figure 4.6 has overlapped pie charts show-
ing area of the AES and multiplier blocks. Notice that for GCM design #2 the
multiplier area is proportionally much higher with the Mastrovito multiplier.

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4.9: Area Histogram for FPGA GCM Designs (*[15])
Figure 4.10: Throughput per Slice Performance for FPGA GCM Designs (*[15])
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There was no notable difference in area between GCM designs implemented
with the FH and KA multipliers. The brute force computations required for six
rows of the Polynomial matrix make the FH design slightly more area consuming
than the KA implementation, which is a reason for the lack of difference in overall
area for those GCM designs. The delay advantage of the FH even though it has
comparable area requirements to the KA allows its throughput per gate efficiency
to be the highest out of all GCM designs when used with the LUT Sbox.
When compared with GCM designs in the literature, the sub-quadratic multi-
pliers showed good throughput per gate efficiency. For the outer pipelined AES-
GCM implementation given in [29] combined with a Mastrovito multiplier, a 42.67
Gbps throughput with 143.40 Kbps/gate efficiency was observed. The FH multi-
plier GCM design showed a higher 232.50 Kbps/gate efficiency, and when compared
with similar throughput rates can be calculated to have a 198 Kbps/gate efficiency.
Similar advantages with the composite Sbox designs can be seen where a 182 Kbp-
s/gate efficiency is observed using matching throughput rates of comparable designs
in [29] which showed a 176 Kbps/gate efficiency.
The focus of the results given above was to show the area efficiency of the de-
signs, but the throughputs achieved in relation to practical applications are also
competitive. The high throughput demands for network applications of GCM in
the industry range from 10 to 40 Gbps currently so the designs presented with
subquadratic multipliers are in line with those requirements [32]. Using the sub-
quadratic multipliers over the Mastrovito approach would in fact be perferred since
the brute force approach provides a higher than needed throughput. Although it is
possible that with increasing throughput demands the Mastrovito multiplier would
have to be used, but by combining the advantage of the subquadratic multipliers in
GCM with better CMOS processes such as a 90nm standard cell library could help
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meet this demand. Other applications of GCM such as tape storage are currently
limited by device read and write speeds so the ASIC designs presented here would
not be as relevant for those applications.
4.3.2 FPGA Results
FPGA implementations of GCM were synthesized, placed and routed using Xilinx
ISE and results are provided in Table 4.2. Three Sbox types were implemented
namely, Block RAM, LUT and composite Sbox. The Block RAM solution is like
a look up table approach, but it uses memory elements within the Virtex 4 FPGA
and is able to provide results after a clock cycle. Due to this property the Block
RAM components act as pipelined registers for AES. The iterative key schedule
used LUT Sbox components, however, to reduce the complexity in using Block
RAM resources.
The area advantage of the subquadratic multiplier over the brute force ap-
proaches used in [15] provide better slice utilization for comparable throughput
rates. The KA multiplier GCM design provided in [39] supports only 128 bit AES
keys, but the multiplier has been optimized to a greater degree. The halting con-
dition was chosen based the lower level LUT component rather than XOR and
AND gates, since they are the building blocks of FPGAs. The slice utilization as
a result is higher, but it is difficult to compare the designs since not all key types
were supported. The FH multiplier GCM implementations for all cases provided
the highest throughput with the exception of the KA implementation given in [39].
The 16.54 Gbps throughput achieved with the Block RAM solution is, to the best
of the authors knowledge, the fasted reported FPGA implementation to date of
GCM.
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4.3.3 Subquadratic Multipliers in Parallel GCM
Given the area flexibility in the subquadratic multiplier GCM designs, they could
potentially be used in current high throughput GCM designs as well. The parallel
GCM architecture could benefit from sub-quadratic multiplier to help reduce its
large area requirements. The 4-parallel design presented in [28] uses four AES en-
cryption blocks and 4 Mastrovito multiplier blocks. When implemented with the
composite Sbox reported results showed a throughput of 102Gbps and with a gate
count of 600 Kgates. Given the 20K gate savings achieved by moving to a sub-
quadratic multiplier design, by using the FH or KA multiplier in the Parallel GCM
architecture, an anticipated 80K gates could be saved without affecting the overall
throughput of the design. This is more then 13% of the current area consumed by
the design. The 4-Parallel GCM using BDD Sboxes has a 900K gate count and 160
Gbps throughput and could also benefit with roughly 8% decrease in area. The
throughput for the design would decrease to 140Gbps in that case, however, since
the subquadratic multiplier would be defining the critical path.
4.4 Key Change Latency Comparisons
In order to calculate the effect of a key change on the overall throughput of GCM,
Eq.(4.1) is used. The function, f(α), represents the number of clock cycles for
computing α bytes of data under a full pipeline. When adding a latency of β
cycles, the efficiency in the throughput is equal to σ, a percentage of efficiency for
the given key change latency. When this σ value is multiplied by the maximum









Figure 4.3 shows the expected throughputs for GCM designs with different
packet sizes based on a incurred key change latency cost. Both the high throughput
designs shown here are from [29, 31]. A 54 Gbps inner and outer pipelined AES-
GCM design with a pipelined multiplier design and a 42.7 Gbps outer pipelined
design were compared with the proposed key schedule design in this thesis. The
latency for the 54Gbps GCM design is 40 clock cycles for a 128 bit key change, and
this lower bound was used in the computations rather than the upper bound of a 56
clock cycle delay expected for 256 bit key changes. The outer pipelined design had
a fixed 14 clock cycle latency while the proposed designs computed latency based
on the varying packet size inputs. The maximum throughput for the thesis design
was set to 36Gbps with the key change latencies of 1 and 4-14 clock cycles.
Figure 4.11: Average Throughputs of different key change latency designs (fixed
packet size)
The packet sizes, however, are not fixed for typical Internet traffic flows. In
order to calculate average throughput of designs the varied distribution needs to be
taken into consideration, which can be computed using the Internet Performance
63
Index given in [19]. The average throughput expected for each of the designs based
on a distribution of 60%, 20%, 15% and 5% for 1500, 576, 552, and 44 byte packets
is provided in Table 4.3. The percentage difference from the maximum throughput
is also provided.
Table 4.3: Throughput of GCM designs with varied key change latencies
Max Throughput
Key Change Latency Average Percentage
(Cycles) Throughput Difference
54 Gbps [31] 40-56 31.75 59
42 Gbps [29] 14 33.32 78
36 Gbps [this work] 4-14 32.35 90
36 Gbps [this work] 1-14 33.99 94
These results show the advantage of the proposed GCM datapath design over
previous state of the art. The average throughputs achieved are competitive with
designs that use much more area resources as well. Average throughputs for the
design in [29] would increase by 4 to 5 Gbps if the improved latency design is used.
An argument against using an online key schedule such as the one proposed here
is that it is possible to load pre-computed round keys from memory thereby saving
the need to compute them on the fly. A key schedule unit that computes the round
keys would be needed in that case and a one time latency cost of key changes would
also exist. If a large number of keys are stored then this could significantly increase
the memory requirements. For certain small router designs, it may be more cost





High throughput GCM designs with subquadratic parallel multipliers have been
presented in this thesis. Both ASIC and FPGA results show higher area utilization
for GCM designs with subquadratic multipliers than implementations using the
brute force Mastrovito multiplier. For composite Sbox GCM implementations, it
has been shown that subquadratic multipliers are an ideal choice since they do not
effect the overall throughput and also reduce the area requirements of the GCM.
This is the first time ASIC implementation results have been presented for the FH
subquadratic multiplier and results show note worthy delay improvements over the
KA multiplier. Although when implemented for the GCM pentanomial, the FH
multiplier has increased area requirements, its efficiency in terms of throughput
per gate is the highest out of all GCM designs. The highest FPGA throughput to
date supporting all AES key types has also been achieved using the FH multiplier
and a Block RAM Sbox.
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5.2 Future Work
Although ASIC implementation throughputs of GCM are limited by the subquadratic
multiplier, there is scope to improve the multiplier delays. There are two methods
presented here that may provide faster throughputs. For the FH multiplier design
it is possible to improve the delay slightly by computing the Polynomial Matrix
step on the key input separately from the multiplier thereby saving a 3TX combi-
natorial delay which is 20% of the current delay. Figure 5.1 shows how this may be
achieved by moving the multiplier key register.
When implementing the multiplier it was noticed that the critical path comes
from the multiplier key inputs B(x), since those signals are sent through a polyno-
mial matrix calculation step. By moving the location of the multiplier key register
after the polynomial matrix calculations, the delay of that operation gets pushed
from the multiplier to the last AES round block. This design would require a
2m− 1 bit register and for the AES block a LUT Sbox would have to be used since
its critical path is smaller than the multipliers. If the delay of the LUT Sbox AES
is affected by the added delay, however, then it is also possible to adjust the register
within the polynomial matrix computations in order to better balance the delay.
The composite Sbox AES has a larger delay than the subquadratic multiplier so it
would not be appropriate for this implementation.
Figure 5.1: Improved delay FH design
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The halting conditions provided in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 for the KA and FH mul-
tipliers respectively, provide good tradeoff conditions that may also be used to
improve the area utilization results. Halting the recursion at 4 is found to be the
most area efficient for both the subquadratic multipliers, but the delay improves
linearly when halting earlier. Although the area increases exponentially, halting at
32, 16, or 8 provides a reasonable area tradeoff for the increase in speed. Figure
5.2 shows this trend comparing the area and delay tradeoffs for varying halting
conditions for both the subquadratic multipliers.
Figure 5.2: Tradeoff between Gate counts and delay for different halting conditions
The Mastrovito multiplier for GCM requires a total of 100420 NAND gates so
when halting the recursion at 32, the subquadratic multiplier area would be a little
less than 60% of the area requirements of the Mastrovito multiplier. For the FH
multiplier, this earlier halting would result in a delay complexity of TA+9TX which
is only a two XOR gate delays higher than the Mastrovito multiplier. The KA
multiplier sees similar benefits, and although approaches the FH multiplier area





A.1 Java Program for Creating Generic FH Mul-
tiplier
import java . u t i l . ∗ ;
/∗∗
∗ This c l a s s g en e r a t e s VHDL code f o r a g en e r i c To e p l i t z Matr ix Vector Product
∗ Mu l t i p l i e r w i th deg ree 2ˆm
∗
∗ e n t i t y TMVPMultiplier i s
∗ Port (
∗ A : in S t d Log i c Vec t o r (0 to 127) ;
∗ B : in S t d Log i c Vec t o r (0 to 254) ;
∗ C : out S t d Log i c Vec t o r (0 to 127)
∗ ) ;
∗ end TMVPMultiplier ;
∗
∗ @author Pujan Pa t e l
∗/
public c lass Toepl itzMult {
Stack s i g n a l s ;
Stack a s s i g n s ;
private int varcount = 0 ;
int xorcount = 0 ;
int andcount = 0 ;
int [ ] xorde lay ;
public Toepl itzMult ( ) {
s i g n a l s = new Stack ( ) ;
a s s i g n s = new Stack ( ) ;
varcount = 0 ;
xorcount = 0 ;
andcount = 0 ;
xorde lay = new int [ 8 ] ;
for ( int i = 0 ; i < 8 ; i++) {
xorde lay [ i ] = 0 ;
}
}
public St r ing [ ] BruteForce ( St r ing [ ] [ ] T, S t r ing [ ] V) {
St r ing [ ] C = new St r ing [V. l ength ] ;
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for ( int i = 0 ; i < V. length ; i++) {
C[ i ] = ”” ;
for ( int j = 0 ; j < T. length ; j++) {
i f (C[ i ] . equa l s ( ”” ) )
C[ i ] = ” ( ” + T[ i ] [ j ] + ” and ” + V[ j ] + ” ) ” ;
else








∗ To e p l i t z Matr ix Re ference
∗ @param V
∗ i s one o f Mu l t i p l i e r parameters
∗ @param l e n g t h
∗ Length o f matr i x
∗/
public St r ing [ ] TMVP( St r ing [ ] [ ] T, S t r ing [ ] V) {
// Loop v a r i a b l e s
int i , j , k ;
S t r ing [ ] [ ] T1 , T3 , T4 , T0 , T2 ;
St r ing [ ] V1 , V0 , V2 , C, C0 , C1 , P0 , P1 , P2 ;
C = null ;
xorde lay [ ( int ) Math . round (Math . l og ( ( double ) (T. l ength ) ) / Math . l og (2) ) ]++;
// End Condi t ion
i f (T. l ength == 4) {
P2 = new St r ing [V. l ength ] ;
P2 [ 0 ] = ” ( ( ( ” + T [ 0 ] [ 0 ] + ” ) and ( ” + V[ 0 ] + ” ) ) xor ”+
” ( ( ” + T [ 0 ] [ 1 ] + ” ) and ( ” + V[ 1 ] + ” ) ) xor ” +
” ( ( ” + T [ 0 ] [ 2 ] + ” ) and ( ” + V[ 2 ] + ” ) ) xor ” +
” ( ( ” + T [ 0 ] [ 3 ] + ” ) and ( ” + V[ 3 ] + ” ) ) ) ” ;
P2 [ 1 ] = ” ( ( ( ” + T[ 1 ] [ 0 ]+ ” ) and ( ” + V[ 0 ] + ” ) ) xor ” +
” ( ( ” + T [ 0 ] [ 0 ] + ” ) and ( ” + V[ 1 ] + ” ) ) xor ” +
” ( ( ” + T [ 0 ] [ 1 ] + ” ) and ( ” + V[ 2 ] + ” ) ) xor ” +
” ( ( ” + T [ 0 ] [ 2 ] + ” ) and ( ” + V[ 3 ] + ” ) ) ) ” ;
P2 [ 2 ] = ” ( ( ( ” + T[ 2 ] [ 0 ]+ ” ) and ( ” + V[ 0 ] + ” ) ) xor ” +
” ( ( ” + T [ 1 ] [ 0 ] + ” ) and ( ” + V[ 1 ] + ” ) ) xor ” +
” ( ( ” + T [ 0 ] [ 0 ] + ” ) and ( ” + V[ 2 ] + ” ) ) xor ” +
” ( ( ” + T [ 0 ] [ 1 ] + ” ) and ( ” + V[ 3 ] + ” ) ) ) ” ;
P2 [ 3 ] = ” ( ( ( ” + T[ 3 ] [ 0 ]+ ” ) and ( ” + V[ 0 ] + ” ) ) xor ” +
” ( ( ” + T [ 2 ] [ 0 ] + ” ) and ( ” + V[ 1 ] + ” ) ) xor ” +
” ( ( ” + T [ 1 ] [ 0 ] + ” ) and ( ” + V[ 2 ] + ” ) ) xor ” +
” ( ( ” + T [ 0 ] [ 0 ] + ” ) and ( ” + V[ 3 ] + ” ) ) ) ” ;
// t h i s . xorcount+=5; //2 s p l i t coun t s
// t h i s . andcount+=3;
this . xorcount += 12 ; // 4 s p l i t coun t s




// Tmp Var i a b l e s
T1 = new St r ing [T. l ength / 2 ] [T. l ength / 2 ] ;
T0 = new St r ing [T. l ength / 2 ] [T. l ength / 2 ] ;
T2 = new St r ing [T. l ength / 2 ] [T. l ength / 2 ] ;
T3 = new St r ing [T. l ength / 2 ] [T. l ength / 2 ] ;
T4 = new St r ing [T. l ength / 2 ] [T. l ength / 2 ] ;
V1 = new St r ing [T. l ength / 2 ] ;
V0 = new St r ing [T. l ength / 2 ] ;
V2 = new St r ing [T. l ength / 2 ] ;
P1 = new St r ing [T. l ength / 2 ] ;
P0 = new St r ing [T. l ength / 2 ] ;
P2 = new St r ing [T. l ength / 2 ] ;
C = new St r ing [V. l ength ] ;
C0 = new St r ing [T. l ength / 2 ] ;
C1 = new St r ing [T. l ength / 2 ] ;
// F i l l a r ray s
for ( i = 0 ; i < (T. l ength / 2) ; i++) {
for ( j = 0 ; j < (T. l ength / 2) ; j++) {
T1 [ i ] [ j ] = T[ i ] [ j ] ;
T2 [ i ] [ j ] = T[ i + (T. l ength / 2) ] [ j ] ;
T0 [ i ] [ j ] = T[ i ] [ j + (T. l ength / 2) ] ;
}
}
for ( i = 0 ; i < (V. l ength / 2) ; i++) {
V0 [ i ] = V[ i ] ;
V1 [ i ] = V[ i + (V. l ength / 2) ] ;
}
// Compute Add i t i on s
AddToeplitz (T1 , T0 , T2 , T3 , T4) ;
AddSingle (V1 , V0 , V2) ;
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// Comput Sub Mu l t i p l i c a t i o n s
P0 = TMVP(T3 , V1) ;
P1 = TMVP(T4 , V0) ;
P2 = TMVP(T1 , V2) ;
// Create s i g n a l f o r P2 in P2
s i g n a l s . push ( ” s i g n a l tmp 6 ” + ( this . varcount )
+ ” : s t d l o g i c v e c t o r (0 to ” + (P2 . l ength − 1) + ” ) ; ” ) ;
for ( i = 0 ; i < P2 . l ength ; i++) {
a s s i g n s . push ( ” tmp 6 ” + ( this . varcount ) + ” ( ” + i + ” ) <= (”
+ P2 [ i ] + ” ) ; ” ) ;
P2 [ i ] = ” tmp 6 ” + ( this . varcount ) + ” ( ” + i + ” ) ” ;
}
this . varcount++;
// Compute f i n a l C answer
AddSingle (P0 , P2 , C0) ;
AddSingle (P1 , P2 , C1) ;
for ( i = 0 ; i < (C0 . l ength ) ; i++) {
C[ i ] = C0 [ i ] ;
C[ i + (C0 . l ength ) ] = C1 [ i ] ;
}
s i g n a l s . push ( ” s i g n a l tmp 7 ” + ( this . varcount )
+ ” : s t d l o g i c v e c t o r (0 to ” + (C. l ength − 1) + ” ) ; ” ) ;
for ( i = 0 ; i < C. length ; i++) {
a s s i g n s . push ( ” tmp 7 ” + ( this . varcount ) + ” ( ” + i + ” ) <= (”
+ C[ i ] + ” ) ; ” ) ;






∗ Pr in t s S i g n a l and Assignment S t a c k s
∗
∗/
public void pr intStack ( ) {
System . out . p r i n t l n ( ”−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−” ) ;
System . out . p r i n t l n ( ”−− XOR COUNT : ” + this . xorcount ) ;
System . out . p r i n t l n ( ”−− AND COUNT : ” + this . andcount ) ;
System . out . p r i n t l n ( ”−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−” ) ;
for ( I t e r a t o r i t=this . s i g n a l s . i t e r a t o r ( ) ; i t . hasNext ( ) ; ) {
System . out . p r i n t l n ( i t . next ( ) ) ;
}
System . out . p r i n t l n ( ”Begin” ) ;
for ( I t e r a t o r i t=this . a s s i g n s . i t e r a t o r ( ) ; i t . hasNext ( ) ; ) {




∗ Adds a s i n g l e s t r i n g array w i th ano ther v i a xor
∗
∗ @param v1 F i r s t operand
∗ @param v0 Second operand
∗ @param v2 Added r e s u l t s t o r e d here
∗/
private void AddSingle ( S t r ing [ ] v1 , S t r ing [ ] v0 , S t r ing [ ] v2 ) {
// TODO Auto−g ene ra t ed method s t u b
i f ( v1 == null | | v0 == null | | v2 == null ) {
// throw (new )
return ;
}
s i g n a l s . push ( ” s i g n a l tmp 5 ” + ( this . varcount )
+ ” : s t d l o g i c v e c t o r (0 to ” + ( v2 . l ength − 1) + ” ) ; ” ) ;
for ( int i = 0 ; i < v2 . l ength ; i++) {
a s s i g n s . push ( ” tmp 5 ” + ( this . varcount ) + ” ( ” + i + ” ) <= (”
+ v1 [ i ] + ” ) xor ( ” + v0 [ i ] + ” ) ; ” ) ;






∗ Adds a 2x2 t o e p l i t z matr ix s e t o f pas sed var and r e t u rn s t3 and t4 , as








private void AddToeplitz ( S t r ing [ ] [ ] t1 , S t r ing [ ] [ ] t0 , S t r ing [ ] [ ] t2 ,
S t r ing [ ] [ ] t3 , S t r ing [ ] [ ] t4 ) {
int i , j ;
// Compute I n i t i a l Add i t i on s
// S i g na l I n i t
s i g n a l s . push ( ” s i g n a l tmp 3 ” + ( this . varcount )
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+ ” : s t d l o g i c v e c t o r (0 to ”
+ ( ( ( 2 ∗ t3 . l ength ) − 2) + t4 . l ength ) + ” ) ; ” ) ;
int count = 0 ;
// Le f tmos t Column ( bottom to top )
for ( i = t1 . l ength − 1 , count = 0 ; i >= 0; i−−, count++) {
a s s i g n s . push ( ” tmp 3 ” + ( this . varcount ) + ” ( ” + count + ” ) <= (”
+ t1 [ i ] [ 0 ] + ” ) xor ( ” + t0 [ i ] [ 0 ] + ” ) ; ” ) ;
t3 [ i ] [ 0 ] = ” tmp 3 ” + ( this . varcount ) + ” ( ” + count + ” ) ” ;
this . xorcount++;
}
// Topmost Row ( l e f t t o r i g h t )
for ( i = 1 ; i < t1 . l ength ; i++, count++) {
a s s i g n s . push ( ” tmp 3 ” + ( this . varcount ) + ” ( ” + count + ” ) <= (”
+ t1 [ 0 ] [ i ] + ” ) xor ( ” + t0 [ 0 ] [ i ] + ” ) ; ” ) ;
t3 [ 0 ] [ i ] = ” tmp 3 ” + ( this . varcount ) + ” ( ” + count + ” ) ” ;
this . xorcount++;
}
// Compute Extended Values
for ( i = 1 ; i < t1 . l ength ; i++) {
for ( j = 1 ; j < t1 . l ength ; j++) {




// Le f tmos t Column ( bottom to top ) ( For bottom matr ix )
for ( i = t1 . l ength − 1 ; i >= 0; i−−, count++) {
a s s i g n s . push ( ” tmp 3 ” + ( this . varcount ) + ” ( ” + count + ” ) <= (”
+ t1 [ i ] [ 0 ] + ” ) xor ( ” + t2 [ i ] [ 0 ] + ” ) ; ” ) ;
t4 [ i ] [ 0 ] = ” tmp 3 ” + ( this . varcount ) + ” ( ” + count + ” ) ” ;
this . xorcount++;
}
// Topmost Row ( l e f t t o r i g h t )
for ( i = 1 ; i < t1 . l ength ; i++) {
t4 [ 0 ] [ i ] = ” tmp 3 ” + ( this . varcount ) + ” ( ” + ( i − 1) + ” ) ” ;
}
// Compute Extended Values f o r T4
for ( i = 1 ; i < t1 . l ength ; i++) {
for ( j = 1 ; j < t1 . l ength ; j++) {





public St r ing [ ] [ ] Tprint ( S t r ing t , int l en ) {
int count , i , j ;
S t r ing [ ] [ ] T = new St r ing [ l en ] [ l en ] ;
s i g n a l s . push ( ” s i g n a l ” + t + ” : s t d l o g i c v e c t o r (0 to ”
+ ((2 ∗ l en ) − 2) + ” ) ; ” ) ;
for ( i = len − 1 , count = 0 ; i >= 0; i−−, count++) {
T[ i ] [ 0 ] = t + ” ( ” + count + ” ) ” ;
a s s i g n s . push ( t + ” ( ” + count + ” ) <= B(” + i + ” ) ; ” ) ;
}
for ( i = 1 ; i < l en ; i++, count++) {
T [ 0 ] [ i ] = t + ” ( ” + count + ” ) ” ;
a s s i g n s . push ( t + ” ( ” + count + ” ) <= B(” + i + ” ) ; ” ) ;
}
for ( i = 1 ; i < l en ; i++) {
for ( j = 1 ; j < l en ; j++) {





public St r ing [ ] [ ] Tprint ( S t r ing t , int len , S t r ing [ ] up , S t r ing [ ] acc ) {
int count , i , j ;
S t r ing [ ] [ ] T = new St r ing [ l en ] [ l en ] ;
s i g n a l s . push ( ” s i g n a l ” + t + ” : s t d l o g i c v e c t o r (0 to ”
+ ((2 ∗ l en ) − 2) + ” ) ; ” ) ;
for ( i = len − 1 , count = 0 ; i >= 0; i−−, count++) {
T[ i ] [ 0 ] = t + ” ( ” + count + ” ) ” ;
a s s i g n s . push ( t + ” ( ” + count + ” ) <= ” + up [ count ] + ” ; ” ) ;
}
for ( i = 1 ; i < l en ; i++, count++) {
T [ 0 ] [ i ] = t + ” ( ” + count + ” ) ” ;
a s s i g n s . push ( t + ” ( ” + count + ” ) <= ” + acc [ i ] + ” ; ” ) ;
}
for ( i = 1 ; i < l en ; i++) {
for ( j = 1 ; j < l en ; j++) {





public void r e s e t ( ) {
s i g n a l s = new Stack ( ) ;
a s s i g n s = new Stack ( ) ;
this . varcount = 0 ;
}
public stat ic void main ( St r ing [ ] args ) {
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int [ ] c ;
int i , j , k ;
Toepl i tzMult tm = new Toepl itzMult ( ) ;
S t r ing [ ] [ ] T = null ;
S t r ing [ ] V = null ;
S t r ing [ ] up , acc ; // F i r s t column , F i r s t row o f T matr ix
int ROOT = 128;
// Create tmp V va l u e
V = new St r ing [ROOT] ;
up = new St r ing [ROOT] ;
acc = new St r ing [ROOT] ;
for ( i = 0 , j=ROOT−1; i < ROOT; i++,j−−) {
V[ i ] = ”A( ” + i + ” ) ” ;
up [ i ] = ”T( ” + j + ” ) ” ;
acc [ i ] = ”T( ” + i+ROOT + ” ) ” ;
}
T = tm . Tprint ( ”T” , ROOT, up , acc ) ;
S t r ing [ ] C = tm .TMVP(T, V) ; // TMVP Mu l t i p l i e r
// S t r i n g [ ] C = tm . BruteForce (T, V) ; // Mas t rov i t o Mu l t i p l i e r
// Pr in t l i n e s f o r c r e a t i n g m u l t i p l i e r code
tm . pr intStack ( ) ;
for ( i = 0 ; i < C. length − 7 ; i++) {
System . out . p r i n t l n ( ”C( ” + ( i + 7) + ” ) <= ” + C[ i ] + ” ; ” ) ;
}
System . out . p r i n t l n ( ”C(0) <= ” + C[ i ] + ” ; ” ) ;
}
}
A.2 Java Program for Creating Generic Karat-
suba Multiplier
package tmvppack ;
import java . u t i l . I t e r a t o r ;
import java . u t i l . Stack ;
/∗
∗ e n t i t y Ka r a t s u b aMu l t i p l i e r i s
∗ Port (
∗ A : in S t d Log i c Vec t o r (0 to 127) ;
∗ B : in S t d Log i c Vec t o r (0 to 127) ;
∗ CT : out S t d Log i c Vec t o r (0 to 254)
∗
∗ ) ;
∗ end Ka r a t s u b aMu l t i p l i e r ;
∗/
public c lass Karatsuba {
Stack s i g n a l s ;




int [ ] xorde lay ;
public Karatsuba ( ) {
s i g n a l s = new Stack ( ) ;
a s s i g n s = new Stack ( ) ;
varcount = 0 ;
xorcount = 0 ;
andcount = 0 ;
xorde lay = new int [ 1 6 ] ;
for ( int i =0; i <16; i++){
xorde lay [ i ]=0;
}
}
private St r ing [ ] karatsuba ( St r ing [ ] a , S t r ing [ ] b ) {
// TODO Auto−g ene ra t ed method s t u b
St r ing [ ] D0 ,D1 ,D2 ;
St r ing [ ] AH,AL,BH,BL;
St r ing [ ] D1A,D1B;
// Resu l t S t r i n g
St r ing [ ] C;
xorde lay [ ( int ) Math . round (Math . l og ( (double ) ( a . l ength ) ) /Math . l og (2) ) ] ++;
i f ( a . l ength ==4){
C = new St r ing [ 7 ] ;
/∗C[ 0 ] = ”(” + a [ 0 ] +” and ”+b [0 ]+ ”) ” ;
C [ 1 ] = ”(” + a [ 0 ] +” and ”+b [ 1 ] +”) xor (”+ a [ 1 ] +” and ”+b [0 ]+ ”) ” ;
C [ 2 ] = ”(” + a [ 1 ] +” and ”+b [1 ]+ ”) ” ; ∗/
C[ 0 ] = ” ( ” + a [ 0 ] + ” and ” + b [ 0 ] + ” ) ” ;
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C[ 1 ] = ” ( ” + a [ 0 ] + ” and ” + b [ 1 ] + ” ) xor ” +
” ( ” + a [ 1 ] + ” and ” + b [ 0 ] + ” ) ” ;
C[ 2 ] = ” ( ” + a [ 0 ] + ” and ” + b [ 2 ] + ” ) xor ” +
” ( ” + a [ 1 ] + ” and ” + b [ 1 ] + ” ) xor ” +
” ( ” + a [ 2 ] + ” and ” + b [ 0 ] + ” ) ” ;
C[ 3 ] = ” ( ” + a [ 0 ] + ” and ” + b [ 3 ] + ” ) xor ” +
” ( ” + a [ 1 ] + ” and ” + b [ 2 ] + ” ) xor ” +
” ( ” + a [ 2 ] + ” and ” + b [ 1 ] + ” ) xor ” +
” ( ” + a [ 3 ] + ” and ” + b [ 0 ] + ” ) ” ;
C[ 4 ] = ” ( ” + a [ 1 ] + ” and ” + b [ 3 ] + ” ) xor ” +
” ( ” + a [ 2 ] + ” and ” + b [ 2 ] + ” ) xor ” +
” ( ” + a [ 3 ] + ” and ” + b [ 1 ] + ” ) ” ;
C[ 5 ] = ” ( ” + a [ 2 ] + ” and ” + b [ 3 ] + ” ) xor ” +
” ( ” + a [ 3 ] + ” and ” + b [ 2 ] + ” ) ” ;
C[ 6 ] = ” ( ” + a [ 3 ] + ” and ” + b [ 3 ] + ” ) ” ;
// S to re r e s u l t in tmp v a r i a b l e
s i g n a l s . push ( ” s i g n a l tmp 4 ” + ( this . varcount )
+ ” : s t d l o g i c v e c t o r (0 to ” + (C. l ength − 1) + ” ) ; ” ) ;
for ( int i = 0 ; i < C. length ; i++) {
a s s i g n s . push ( ” tmp 4 ” + ( this . varcount ) + ” ( ” + i + ” ) <= (”
+ C[ i ] + ” ) ; ” ) ;
C[ i ] = ” tmp 4 ” + ( this . varcount ) + ” ( ” + i + ” ) ” ;
}
this . varcount++;
this . xorcount += 9 ;
this . andcount += 16 ;
} else {
// Popu la t e h a l f terms :
AH = new St r ing [ a . l ength / 2 ] ;
AL = new St r ing [ a . l ength / 2 ] ;
BH = new St r ing [ a . l ength / 2 ] ;
BL = new St r ing [ a . l ength / 2 ] ;
System . arraycopy (a , a . l ength / 2 , AH, 0 , a . l ength / 2) ;
System . arraycopy (a , 0 , AL, 0 , a . l ength / 2) ;
System . arraycopy (b , b . l ength / 2 , BH, 0 , b . l ength / 2) ;
System . arraycopy (b , 0 , BL, 0 , b . l ength / 2) ;
D1A = new St r ing [ a . l ength / 2 ] ;
D1B = new St r ing [ a . l ength / 2 ] ;
AddPoly (AL, AH, D1A) ;
AddPoly (BL, BH, D1B) ;
D0 = karatsuba (AL, BL) ;
D1 = karatsuba (D1A, D1B) ;
D2 = karatsuba (AH, BH) ;
// Need to add D1 ,D0 and D2 i n t o D1
AddPoly (D1 , D0 , D2 , D1) ;
C = new St r ing [ (D0 . l ength ∗ 2) + 1 ] ;
for ( int i = 0 ; i < C. length ; i++) {
C[ i ] = ”” ;
}
// D0 and D2 are t h e same l e n g t h
for ( int i = 0 ; i < D0 . l ength ; i++) {
C[ i ] = D0 [ i ] ;
}
int index = 0 ;
for ( int i = 0 ; i < D2 . l ength ; i++) {
index = i + (C. l ength − D2 . l ength ) ;
i f (C[ index ] . equa l s ( ”” ) )
C[ index ] = D2 [ i ] ;
else {




for ( int i = 0 ; i < D1 . l ength ; i++) {
index = i + ( (C. l ength − 1) / 2 − ( (D1 . l ength − 1) / 2) ) ;
i f (C[ index ] . equa l s ( ”” ) )
C[ index ] = D1 [ i ] ;
else {




s i g n a l s . push ( ” s i g n a l tmp 5 ” + ( this . varcount )
+ ” : s t d l o g i c v e c t o r (0 to ” + (C. l ength − 1) + ” ) ; ” ) ;
for ( int i = 0 ; i < C. length ; i++) {
a s s i g n s . push ( ” tmp 5 ” + ( this . varcount ) + ” ( ” + i + ” ) <= (”
+ C[ i ] + ” ) ; ” ) ;





private void AddPoly ( St r ing [ ] A, St r ing [ ] B, S t r ing [ ] C, St r ing [ ] D) {
// TODO Auto−g ene ra t ed method s t u b
s i g n a l s . push ( ” s i g n a l tmp 3 ” + ( this . varcount )
+ ” : s t d l o g i c v e c t o r (0 to ” + (D. l ength − 1) + ” ) ; ” ) ;
for ( int i = 0 ; i < A. length ; i++) {
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a s s i g n s . push ( ” tmp 3 ” + ( this . varcount ) + ” ( ” + i + ” ) <= (”
+ A[ i ] + ” xor ” + B[ i ] + ” xor ” + C[ i ] + ” ) ; ” ) ;
D[ i ] = ” tmp 3 ” + ( this . varcount ) + ” ( ” + i + ” ) ” ;




private void AddPoly ( St r ing [ ] A, St r ing [ ] B, S t r ing [ ] C) {
// TODO Auto−g ene ra t ed method s t u b
s i g n a l s . push ( ” s i g n a l tmp 2 ” + ( this . varcount )
+ ” : s t d l o g i c v e c t o r (0 to ” + (C. l ength − 1) + ” ) ; ” ) ;
for ( int i = 0 ; i < A. length ; i++) {
a s s i g n s . push ( ” tmp 2 ” + ( this . varcount ) + ” ( ” + i + ” ) <= (”
+ A[ i ] + ” xor ” + B[ i ] + ” ) ; ” ) ;





public void pr intStack ( ) {
System . out . p r i n t l n ( ”−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−” ) ;
System . out . p r i n t l n ( ”−− XOR COUNT : ” + this . xorcount ) ;
System . out . p r i n t l n ( ”−− AND COUNT : ” + this . andcount ) ;
System . out . p r i n t l n ( ”−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−” ) ;
for ( I t e r a t o r i t=this . s i g n a l s . i t e r a t o r ( ) ; i t . hasNext ( ) ; ) {
System . out . p r i n t l n ( i t . next ( ) ) ;
}
System . out . p r i n t l n ( ”Begin” ) ;
for ( I t e r a t o r i t=this . a s s i g n s . i t e r a t o r ( ) ; i t . hasNext ( ) ; ) {




∗ Karatsuba Mu l t i p l i e r Design
∗/
public stat ic void main ( St r ing [ ] a rgs ) {
// TODO Auto−g ene ra t ed method s t u b
int i , j , k ;
int ROOT = 128;
St r ing [ ] A = new St r ing [ROOT] ;
S t r ing [ ] B = new St r ing [ROOT] ;
for ( i = 0 ; i < A. length ; i++) {
A[ i ] = ”A( ” + i + ” ) ” ;
B[ i ] = ”B( ” + i + ” ) ” ;
}
Karatsuba ks = new Karatsuba ( ) ;
S t r ing [ ] C = ks . karatsuba (A, B) ;
// Pr in t l i n e s f o r c r e a t i n g m u l t i p l i e r code
ks . pr in tStack ( ) ;
for ( i = 0 ; i < C. length ; i++) {










read_hdl -vhdl {ABubble.vhd AESmain.vhd ToeplitzMultiplier.vhd lutsbox.vhd reglutsbox.vhd BlockCounter.vhd
BufferBlock.vhd Chain192.vhd compositesbox.vhd CtrlBubble.vhd CtrlRegister.vhd GCMmain.vhd
GF2_4mult.vhd GFMultBlock.vhd IVcounter.vhd KeySchedule.vhd KeyScheduleBlock.vhd
MastrovitoMultiplier.vhd mixcolumns.vhd Mux3to1.vhd regcompositesbox.vhd round_unit.vhd
shiftrows.vhd SingleReg.vhd StateTransform.vhd subbytesshiftrows.vhd XorBlock.vhd XorChain.vhd }
elaborate GCMmain
define_clock -name clk -period 3500 [find -port clk]
external_delay -input 0 -c clk /designs/*/ports_in/*
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